Fixing races for fun and profit: how to abuse atime

  • Authors:
  • Nikita Borisov;Rob Johnson;Naveen Sastry;David Wagner

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Berkeley;University of California, Berkeley;University of California, Berkeley;University of California, Berkeley

  • Venue:
  • SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Dean and Hu proposed a probabilistic countermeasure to the classic access(2)/open(2) TOCTTOU race condition in privileged Unix programs [4]. In this paper, we describe an attack that succeeds with very high probability against their countermeasure. We then consider a stronger randomized variant of their defense and show that it, too, is broken. We conclude that access(2) must never be used in privileged Unix programs. The tools we develop can be used to attack other filesystem races, underscoring the importance of avoiding such races in secure software.