Evolution of market mechanism through a continuous space of auction-types

Authors:
D. Cliff
Affiliations:
Hewlett-Packard Labs., Bristol, UK
Venue:
CEC '02 Proceedings of the Evolutionary Computation on 2002. CEC '02. Proceedings of the 2002 Congress - Volume 02
Year:
2002

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Abstract

A continuous space of auction mechanisms is explored via a genetic algorithm, with ZIP artificial trading agents ope rating in the evolved markets. The space of possible auction-types includes the Continuous Double Auction and also two purely one-sided mechanisms, yet hybrids of these auction types are regularly found to give the most desirable market dynamics.