Exploitation and peacekeeping: introducing more sophisticated interactions to the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Authors:
T. Ord;A. Blair
Affiliations:
Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Software Eng., Melbourne Univ., Vic., Australia;Informatics Res. Inst., Leeds Univ., UK
Venue:
CEC '02 Proceedings of the Evolutionary Computation on 2002. CEC '02. Proceedings of the 2002 Congress - Volume 02
Year:
2002

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Abstract

We present a new paradigm extending the iterated prisoner's dilemma to multiple players. Our model is unique in granting players information about past interactions between all pairs of players - allowing for much more sophisticated social behaviour. We provide an overview of preliminary results and discuss the implications in terms of the evolutionary dynamics of strategies.