Assurance Based Development of Critical Systems

Authors:
Patrick J. Graydon;John C. Knight;Elisabeth A. Strunk
Affiliations:
University of Virginia, USA;University of Virginia, USA;The Aerospace Corporation
Venue:
DSN '07 Proceedings of the 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Year:
2007

Citing 0
Cited 7

Engineering, communication, and safety

SCS '07 Proceedings of the twelfth Australian workshop on Safety critical systems and software and safety-related programmable systems - Volume 86
UML for software safety and certification: model-based development of safety-critical software-intensive systems

MBEERTS'07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Dagstuhl conference on Model-based engineering of embedded real-time systems
A lightweight code analysis and its role in evaluation of a dependability case

Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Software Engineering
Approaching runtime trust assurance in open adaptive systems

Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems
Software certification: is there a case against safety cases?

FOCS'10 Proceedings of the 16th Monterey conference on Foundations of computer software: modeling, development, and verification of adaptive systems
A safety case pattern for model-based development approach

NFM'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on NASA Formal Methods
Certification-based development of critical systems

Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Software Engineering

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.02

Visualization

Abstract

Assurance Based Development (ABD) is the synergistic construction of a critical computing system and an assurance case that sets out the dependability claims for the system and argues that the available evidence justifies those claims. Co-developing the system and its assurance case helps software developers to make technology choices that address the specific dependability goal of each component. This approach gives developers: (1) confidence that the technologies selected will support the system's dependability goal and (2) flexibility to deploy expensive technology, such as formal verification, only on components whose assurance needs demand it. ABD simplifies the detection-- and thereby avoidance--of potential assurance difficulties as they arise, rather than after development is complete. In this paper, we present ABD together with a case study of its use.