A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A light-weight distributed scheme for detecting ip prefix hijacks in real-time
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
On the impact of route monitor selection
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Practical defenses against BGP prefix hijacking
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SIGMETRICS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Ispy: detecting ip prefix hijacking on my own
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Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Stealthy IP prefix hijacking: don't bite off more than you can chew
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
The (in)completeness of the observed internet AS-level structure
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Locating prefix hijackers using LOCK
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
iSPY: detecting IP prefix hijacking on my own
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Emulation on the internet prefix hijacking attack impaction
ICT-EurAsia'13 Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Information and Communication Technology
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A prefix hijack attack involves an attacker announcing victim networks' IP prefixes into the global routing system. As a result, data traffic from portions of the Internet can be diverted to attacker networks. Prefix hijack attacks are a serious security threat in the Internet and it is important to understand the factors that affect the resiliency of victim networks against these attacks. In this paper, we conducted a systematic study to gauge the effectiveness of prefix hijacks launched at different locations in the Internet topology. Our study shows that direct customers of multiple tier- 1 networks are the most resilient, even more than the tier- 1 networks themselves. Conversely, if these customer networks are used to launch prefix hijacks, they would also be the most effective launching pads for attacks. We verified our results through case studies using real prefix hijack incidents that had occurred in the Internet.