Some Problems in Sanitizing Network Data

Authors:
Matt Bishop;Rick Crawford;Bhume Bhumiratana;Lisa Clark;Karl Levitt
Affiliations:
University of California at Davis, USA;University of California at Davis, USA;University of California at Davis, USA;University of California at Davis, USA;University of California at Davis, USA
Venue:
WETICE '06 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Year:
2006

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Abstract

The problem of removing sensitive information from data before it is released publicly, or turned over to less trusted analysts, underlies much of the unwillingness to share data. The solution is to sanitize, or deidentify, parts of the data. When dealing with network addresses, the set of available addresses is finite. This limits some aspects of the sanitization. We analyze this problem in detail, and suggest approaches to ameliorate it.