Equilibria for networks with malicious users

Authors:
George Karakostas;Anastasios Viglas
Affiliations:
McMaster University, Department of Computing and Software, 1280 Main St. West, L8S 4K1, Hamilton, ON, Canada;University of Sydney, School of Information Technologies, Madsen Building F09, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Venue:
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behavior. While selfish users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible damage to the overall cost. We define a generalized model, present characterizations of flows at equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a flow at equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed.