ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Integrating security in inter-domain routing protocols
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
The official PGP user's guide
Security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Understanding Public-Key Infrastructure: Concepts, Standards, and Deployment Considerations
Understanding Public-Key Infrastructure: Concepts, Standards, and Deployment Considerations
Modelling a Public-Key Infrastructure
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Toward acceptable metrics of authentication
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Origin authentication in interdomain routing
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical BGP
SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Deploying and Using Public Key Technology: Lessons Learned in Real Life
IEEE Security and Privacy
A Look Back at "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite"
ACSAC '04 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Aggregated path authentication for efficient BGP security
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Securing routing protocols through information corroboration
Securing routing protocols through information corroboration
Another Look at "Provable Security"
Journal of Cryptology
Listen and whisper: security mechanisms for BGP
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
On the release of CRLs in public key infrastructure
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
An infrastructure supporting secure internet routing
EuroPKI 2006 Proceedings of the Third European conference on Public Key Infrastructure: theory and Practice
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Symmetric Key Approaches to Securing BGP --- A Little Bit Trust Is Enough
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Probabilistic IP prefix authentication (PIPA) for prefix hijacking
CFI '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Future Internet Technologies
Robust Decentralized Virtual Coordinate Systems in Adversarial Environments
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Enhancing the trust of internet routing with lightweight route attestation
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Expected convergence properties of BGP
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Sign what you really care about --- secure BGP AS paths efficiently
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
Private and verifiable interdomain routing decisions
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2012 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Private and verifiable interdomain routing decisions
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review - Special october issue SIGCOMM '12
Architecture of the remote routing validation tool for BGP anomaly detection
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Research in Applied Computation Symposium
A forensic case study on as hijacking: the attacker's perspective
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Sign what you really care about - Secure BGP AS-paths efficiently
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
The BGP monitoring and alarming system to detect and prevent anomaly IP prefix advertisement
Proceedings of the 2013 Research in Adaptive and Convergent Systems
The security appliance to BIRD software router
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
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It is well known that the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the IETF standard interdomain routing protocol, is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, and that a single misconfigured or malicious BGP speaker could result in large-scale service disruption. In this paper, we present Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP)---a proposal for securing BGP, including an architectural overview, design details for significant aspects, and preliminary security and operational analysis. psBGP differs from other security proposals (e.g., S-BGP and soBGP) in that it makes use of a single-level PKI for AS number authentication, a decentralized trust model for verifying the propriety of IP prefix origin, and a rating-based stepwise approach for AS_PATH (integrity) verification. psBGP trades off the strong security guarantees of S-BGP for presumed-simpler operation, e.g., using a PKI with a simple structure, with a small number of certificate types, and of manageable size. psBGP is designed to successfully defend against various (nonmalicious and malicious) threats from uncoordinated BGP speakers, and to be incrementally deployed with incremental benefits.