Authenticating secure tokens using slow memory access

Authors:
John Kelsey;Bruce Schneier
Affiliations:
Counterpane system, Minneapolis, MN;Counterpane system, Minneapolis, MN
Venue:
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Year:
1999

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Abstract

We present an authentication protocol that allows a token, such as a smart card, to authenticate itself to a back-end trusted computer system through an untrusted reader. This protocol relies on the fact that the token will only respond to queries slowly, and that the token owner will not sit patiently while the reader seems not to be working. This protocol can be used alone, with "dumb" memory tokens or with processor-based tokens.