Secure videoconferencing

Authors:
Peter Honeyman;Andy Adamson;Kevin Coffman;Janani Janakiraman;Rob Jerdonek;Jim Rees
Affiliations:
Center for Information Technology Integration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;Center for Information Technology Integration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;Center for Information Technology Integration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;Center for Information Technology Integration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;Center for Information Technology Integration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;Center for Information Technology Integration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Venue:
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Year:
1998

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Abstract

At the Center for Information Technology Integration, we are experimenting with algorithms and protocols for building secure applications. In our security testbed, we have modified VIC, an off-the-shelf videoconferencing application, to support GSS, a generic security interface. We then layered these interfaces onto a smartcard-based key distribution algorithm and a fast cipher. Because these components are accompanied by rigorous mathematical proofs of security and are accessed through narrowly-defined interfaces, we have confidence in the strength of the system's security.