Improving prediction for procedure returns with return-address-stack repair mechanisms
MICRO 31 Proceedings of the 31st annual ACM/IEEE international symposium on Microarchitecture
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Transparent run-time defense against stack smashing attacks
ATEC '00 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Runtime countermeasures for code injection attacks against C and C++ programs
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Conventional Security have relied on overwriting the saved return pointer on the stack to hijack the path of execution. Under Sun Microsystem's Sparc processor architecture, we were able to implement a kernel modification to transparently and automatically guard application's return pointers. Our implementation called Stack Ghost Open-BSD 2.8 acts as a ghost in the machine. Stack-Ghost advances exploit prevention in that it protects every application run on the system without their knowledge nor does it require their source or binary modification. We will document several of the methods devised to preserve the sanctity of the system and will explore the performance ramifications of Stack Ghost.