Alpaca: extensible authorization for distributed services
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Variations in Access Control Logic
DEON '08 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
A modal deconstruction of access control logics
FOSSACS'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of the Theory and practice of software, 11th international conference on Foundations of software science and computational structures
TAPIDO: trust and authorization via provenance and integrity in distributed objects
ESOP'08/ETAPS'08 Proceedings of the Theory and practice of software, 17th European conference on Programming languages and systems
Access control based on code identity for open distributed systems
TGC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Trustworthy global computing
Refinement types for secure implementations
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Belief semantics of authorization logic
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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We address the programmatic realization of the access control model of security in distributed systems. Our aim is to bridge the gap between abstract/declarative policies and their concrete/operational implementations. We present a programming formalism (which extends the asynchronous pi-calculus with explicit principals) and a specification logic (which extends Datalog with primitives from authorization logic). We provide two kinds of static analysis methods to tie implementation to specification. Type checking determines that a program is a sound implementation of policy; i.e., that all granted accesses are safe in the face of arbitrary opponents. Model checking determines a degree of completeness; i.e., that accesses permitted by the policy are actually granted in the implementation.