Proving Arrow's theorem by PROLOG

  • Authors:
  • Kenryo Indo

  • Affiliations:
  • Economics, Kanto Gakuen University, Ota, Japan 3738515

  • Venue:
  • Computational Economics
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

This paper presented a simple PROLOG implementation for Arrow's Social welfare function (SWF). Arrow (Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press, 1963) proved that any SWF which satisfies a set of conditions IIA, Pareto, and unrestricted domain should be dictatorial. The PROLOG program can prove the theorem for 3-alternative 2-agent case. With a minor modification it proves a version of the theorem without the Pareto condition by Wilson (Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 478---486, 1972).