The STATEMATE semantics of statecharts
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
From Safety Analysis to Software Requirements
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The STATEMATE Verification Environment - Making It Real
CAV '00 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
A Method for Analyzing Software Faults Based on Mining Outliers' Feature Attribute Sets
AMT '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Active Media Technology
Modular analysis and modelling of risk scenarios with dependencies
Journal of Systems and Software
Quantitative verification of system safety in event-B
SERENE'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Software engineering for resilient systems
A safety-focused verification using software fault trees
Future Generation Computer Systems
Minimal cut sequence generation for state/event fault trees
Proceedings of the 2013 Middleware Doctoral Symposium
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Safety is an important requirement for many modern systems. To ensure safety of complex critical systems, well-known safety analysis methods have been formalized. This holds in particular for automation sytsems and transportation systems. In this paper we present the formalization of one of the most wide spread safety analysis methods: fault tree analysis (FTA). Formal FTA allows to rigorously reason about completeness of a faulty tree. This means it is possible to prove whether a certain combination of component failures is critical for system failure or not. This is a big step forward as informal reasoning on cause-consequence relations is very error-prone. We report on our experiences with a real world case study from the domain of railroads. The here presented case study is - to our knowledge - the first complete formal fault tree analysis for an infinite state system. Until now only finite state systems have been analyzed with formal FTA by using model checking.