A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Differential fault analysis on the ARIA algorithm
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Analysis and design of a secure key exchange scheme
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Differential fault analysis of AES: Toward reducing number of faults
Information Sciences: an International Journal
A new proxy signature scheme for a specified group of verifiers
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Hard fault analysis of Trivium
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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Digital signature schemes with fault tolerance make it possible for error detections and corrections during the processes of data computations and transmissions. Recently, Zhang, in 1999, and Lee and Tsai, in 2003, have respectively proposed two efficient fault-tolerant schemes based on the RSA cryptosystem. Both of them can efficiently check the sender's identity and keep the confidentiality of the transmitted document. Furthermore, they can detect the errors and correct them. However, these schemes have a common weakness in security, that is, different messages may easily be computed that have the same signature. Thus, a valid signature could be reused in another document. This severely violates the principles of digital signature. In this paper, we shall show that this security flaw existed in the two perviously proposed schemes and conclude that the security flaw may occur in other fault-tolerant public key cryptosystems that are similar to these schemes. Furthermore, we will improve Zhang's and Lee and Tsai's schemes to eliminate the drawbacks.