First price sealed bid auction without auctioneers

Authors:
Shuo Zheng;Luke McAven;Yi Mu
Affiliations:
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia;University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia;University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia
Venue:
IWCMC '07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing
Year:
2007

Citing 7
Cited 0

The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party

CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design

Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-interactive Private Auctions

FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption

PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
A two-server, sealed-bid auction protocol

FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust

FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We propose two protocol variants for a first price sealed-bid auction, without using intermediatory auctioneers. One version achieves full privacy for the bidders and their bids, the other provides a form of verifiability, at the cost of some privacy. Full privacy protects all bids. In particular the winner's identity and price are only known by the seller. Lesser privacy allows the winner to be known and verified publicly. Both versions provide non-repudiation. We demonstrate correctness and show how computational and communication costs vary with different privacy levels.