An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Key storage in secure networks
Discrete Applied Mathematics
A matrix key-distribution scheme
Journal of Cryptology
Secret-key agreement without public-key
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
On k-connectivity for a geometric random graph
Random Structures & Algorithms
System architecture directions for networked sensors
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
On the minimum node degree and connectivity of a wireless multihop network
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing Pairwise Keys for Secure Communication in Ad Hoc Networks: A Probabilistic Approach
ICNP '03 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Random key-assignment for secure Wireless Sensor Networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Sizzle: A Standards-Based End-to-End Security Architecture for the Embedded Internet (Best Paper)
PERCOM '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
State of the Art in Ultra-Low Power Public Key Cryptography for Wireless Sensor Networks
PERCOMW '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
An efficient scheme for authenticating public keys in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Deterministic key predistribution schemes for distributed sensor networks
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
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A promising solution for trust establishment in wireless sensor networks is the assignment of cryptographic seeds (keys, secrets, etc.) to sensor nodes prior to network deployment, known as key predistribution. In this article, we propose a canonical seed assignment model for key predistribution characterizing seed assignment in terms of the probability distribution describing the number of nodes receiving each seed and the algorithm for seed assignment. In addition, we present a sampling framework for seed assignment algorithms in the canonical model. We propose a probabilistic k-connectivity model for randomly deployed secure networks using spatial statistics and geometric random graph theory. We analyze key predistribution schemes in the canonical model in terms of network connectivity and resilience to node capture. The analytical results can be used to determine the average or worst-case connectivity or resilience to node capture for a key predistribution scheme. Furthermore, we demonstrate the design of new key predistribution schemes and the inclusion of existing schemes in the canonical model. Finally, we present a general approach to analyze the addition of nodes to an existing secure network and derive results for a well-known scheme.