A light-weight distributed scheme for detecting ip prefix hijacks in real-time

  • Authors:
  • Changxi Zheng;Lusheng Ji;Dan Pei;Jia Wang;Paul Francis

  • Affiliations:
  • Cornell University, Ithaca, NY;AT&T Labs - Research, Florham Park, NJ;AT&T Labs - Research, Florham Park, NJ;AT&T Labs - Research, Florham Park, NJ;Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
  • Year:
  • 2007

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As more and more Internet IP prefix hijacking incidents are being reported, the value of hijacking detection services has become evident. Most of the current hijacking detection approaches monitor IP prefixes on the control plane and detect inconsistencies in route advertisements and route qualities. We propose a different approach that utilizes information collected mostly from the data plane. Our method is motivated by two key observations: when a prefix is not hijacked, 1) the hop count of the path from a source to this prefix is generally stable; and 2) the path from a source to this prefix is almost always a super-path of the path from the same source to a reference point along the previous path, as long as the reference point is topologically close to the prefix. By carefully selecting multiple vantage points and monitoring from these vantage points for any departure from these two observations, our method is able to detect prefix hijacking with high accuracy in a light-weight, distributed, and real-time fashion. Through simulations constructed based on real Internet measurement traces, we demonstrate that our scheme is accurate with both false positive and false negative ratios below 0.5%.