Bilattices and the semantics of logic programming
Journal of Logic Programming
Artificial Intelligence
A qualitative approach to face uncertainty in decision models
Proceedings of the conference on First specialized conference on decision support systems
International Journal of Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Fuzzy sets in decision analysis, operations research and statistics
Possibility Theory, Probability Theory and Multiple-Valued Logics: A Clarification
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Towards a Possibilistic Logic Handling of Preferences
Applied Intelligence
Paraconsistent reasoning and preferential entailments by signed quantified Boolean formulae
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
Bilattice-Based squares and triangles
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Main sources of inaccurate determination, uncertainty and imprecision in decision models
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
ICLA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd Indian Conference on Logic and Its Applications
Interpreting GUHA Data Mining Logic in Paraconsistent Fuzzy Logic Framework
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
An Inductive Methodology for Data-Based Rules Building
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Paraconsistent semantics for Pavelka style fuzzy sentential logic
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
A fuzzy and bipolar approach to preference modeling with application to need and desire
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
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The use of positive and negative reasons in inference and decision aiding is a recurrent issue of investigation as far as the type of formal language to use within a DSS is concerned. A language enabling to explicitly take into account such reasons is Belnap's logic and the four valued logics derived from it. In this paper, we explore the interpretation of a continuous extension of a four valued logic as a necessity degree (in possibility theory). It turns out that, in order to take full advantage of the four values, we have to consider ''sub-normalised'' necessity measures. Under such a hypothesis four valued logics become the natural logical frame for such an approach.