Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Improved Results for Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Network-Optimized Road Pricing: Part I: a Parable and a Model
Operations Research
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
SIAM Journal on Computing
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
ESA'06 Proceedings of the 14th conference on Annual European Symposium - Volume 14
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Network games with atomic players
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Theoretical Computer Science
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Improving the Efficiency of Load Balancing Games through Taxes
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Approximation and Online Algorithms
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
On the existence of optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Stackelberg strategies for network design games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
The price of optimum in a matching game
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
The stackelberg minimum spanning tree game
WADS'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Data Structures
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It is well known that in a network with arbitrary (convex) latency functions that are a function of edge traffic, the worst-case ratio, over all inputs, of the system delay caused due to selfish behavior versus the system delay of the optimal centralized solution may be unbounded even if the system consists of only two parallel links. This ratio is called the price of anarchy (PoA). In this paper, we investigate ways by which one can reduce the performance degradation due to selfish behavior. We investigate two primary methods (a) Stackelberg routing strategies, where a central authority, e.g., network manager, controls a fixed fraction of the flow, and can route this flow in any desired way so as to influence the flow of selfish users; and (b) network tolls, where tolls are imposed on the edges to modify the latencies of the edges, and thereby influence the induced Nash equilibrium. We obtain results demonstrating the effectiveness of both Stackelberg strategies and tolls in controlling the price of anarchy. For Stackelberg strategies, we obtain the first results for nonatomic routing in graphs more general than parallel-link graphs, and strengthen existing results for parallel-link graphs, (i) In series-parallel graphs, we show that Stackelberg routing reduces the PoA to a constant (depending on the fraction of flow controlled). (ii) For general graphs, we obtain latency-class specific bounds on the PoA with Stackelberg routing, which give a continuous trade-off between the fraction of flow controlled and the price of anarchy, (iii) In parallel-link graphs, we show that for any given class L of latency functions, Stackelberg routing reduces the PoA to at most α + (1 - α) · ρ(L), where α is the fraction of flow controlled and ρ(L) is the PoA of class L (when α = 0). For network tolls, motivated by the known strong results for nonatomic games, we consider the more general setting of atomic splittable routing games. We show that tolls inducing an optimal flow always exist, even for general asymmetric games with heterogeneous users, and can be computed efficiently by solving a convex program. Furthermore, we give a complete characterization of flows that can be induced via tolls. These are the first results on the effectiveness of tolls for atomic splittable games.