A Formal Language for Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue dedicated to Gustavus J. Simmons
From Safety Analysis to Software Requirements
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The Logic of Authentication Protocols
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
A Formal Specification of Requirements for Payment Transactions in the SET Protocol
FC '98 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Intensional specifications of security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Formal Analysis of Some Properties of Kerberos 5 Using MSR
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
A formalism for visual security protocol modeling
Journal of Visual Languages and Computing
Foundations of attack-defense trees
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Computational aspects of attack---defense trees
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
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In this paper we show how we can increase the ease of reading and writing security requirements for cryptographic protocols at the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction by developing a visual language based on fault trees. We develop such a semantics for a subset of NPATRL, a temporal language used for expressing safety requirements for cryptographic protocols, and show that the subset is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. We also show how the fault trees can be used to improve the presentation of some specifications that we developed in our analysis of the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol. Other examples involve a property of Kerberos 5, and a visual account of the requirements in Lowe's authentication hierarchy.