Fundamentals of computer security technology
Fundamentals of computer security technology
Information Algebras: Generic Structures for Inference
Information Algebras: Generic Structures for Inference
Boolean Functions
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Analyzing Security Scenarios Using Defence Trees and Answer Set Programming
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Multi-state Directed Acyclic Graphs
CAI '07 Proceedings of the 20th conference of the Canadian Society for Computational Studies of Intelligence on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Security Protocol Testing Using Attack Trees
CSE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering - Volume 02
Serial model for attack tree computations
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Using attack and protection trees to analyze threats and defenses to homeland security
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
Attack-defense trees and two-player binary zero-sum extensive form games are equivalent
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
Foundations of attack-defense trees
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Generic Inference: A Unifying Theory for Automated Reasoning
Generic Inference: A Unifying Theory for Automated Reasoning
OWA trees and their role in security modeling using attack trees
Information Sciences: an International Journal
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Attribute Decoration of Attack-Defense Trees
International Journal of Secure Software Engineering
Quantitative questions on attack: defense trees
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Attack---defense trees extend attack trees with defense nodes. This richer formalism allows for a more precise modeling of a system's vulnerabilities, by representing interactions between possible attacks and corresponding defensive measures. In this paper we compare the computational complexity of both formalisms. We identify semantics for which extending attack trees with defense nodes does not increase the computational complexity. This implies that, for these semantics, every query that can be solved efficiently on attack trees can also be solved efficiently on attack---defense trees. Furthermore, every algorithm for attack trees can directly be used to process attack---defense trees.