Computational aspects of attack---defense trees

  • Authors:
  • Barbara Kordy;Marc Pouly;Patrick Schweitzer

  • Affiliations:
  • CSC and SnT, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg;CSC and SnT, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg;CSC and SnT, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

  • Venue:
  • SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Attack---defense trees extend attack trees with defense nodes. This richer formalism allows for a more precise modeling of a system's vulnerabilities, by representing interactions between possible attacks and corresponding defensive measures. In this paper we compare the computational complexity of both formalisms. We identify semantics for which extending attack trees with defense nodes does not increase the computational complexity. This implies that, for these semantics, every query that can be solved efficiently on attack trees can also be solved efficiently on attack---defense trees. Furthermore, every algorithm for attack trees can directly be used to process attack---defense trees.