Secrets and Lies
Runtime Monitoring and Dynamic Reconfiguration for Intrusion Detection Systems
RAID '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Strategic games on defense trees
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Serial model for attack tree computations
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Using attack and protection trees to analyze threats and defenses to homeland security
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
Foundations of attack-defense trees
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Foundations of attack-defense trees
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Computational aspects of attack---defense trees
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
Attribute Decoration of Attack-Defense Trees
International Journal of Secure Software Engineering
Quantitative questions on attack: defense trees
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Attack-defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack-defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show that attack-defense trees and binary zero-sum two-player extensive form games have equivalent expressive power when considering satisfiability, in the sense that they can be converted into each other while preserving their outcome and their internal structure.