Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
A skeptical view of DRM and fair use
Communications of the ACM - Digital rights management
A DRM security architecture for home networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Analysis of an incentives-based secrets protection system
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Import/export in digital rights management
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Content availability, pollution and poisoning in file sharing peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Fairer usage contracts for DRM
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
DRM interoperability analysis from the perspective of a layered framework
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Graceful infringement reactions in DRM systems
Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic analyses of adoptions of security policies for DRM
CCNC'09 Proceedings of the 6th IEEE Conference on Consumer Communications and Networking Conference
Using social factors in digital rights management
HotSec'09 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
An interoperable usage management framework
Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM workshop on Digital rights management
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In this paper we cast DRM in a setting that allows us to model a number of current approaches as games. The DRM game is partitioned into two subgames, one that considers the game associated with content acquisition, and a second that considers how a consumer uses the content, along with a vendor's response to this usage. Examples are provided in order to demonstrate how these subgames correspond to real situations associated with content industries, and the conditions under which Nash equilibria will exist. These subgames form the primary stage of a repeated game that models a number of important long-term interactions between consumers and vendors. We analyze current strategies that attempt to influence the outcome of the repeated game, and we also consider a new type of architectural infrastructure that makes novel use of a trust authority in order to create a suitable environment for constructing DRM games that may prove useful in the future.