Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Hordes: a multicast based protocol for anonymity
Journal of Computer Security
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Data collection with self-enforcing privacy
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Digital Rights Management
Data Collection with Self-Enforcing Privacy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Informant: detecting sybils using incentives
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Using social factors in digital rights management
HotSec'09 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Economic incentives for protecting digital rights online
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Once electronic content has been released it is very difficult to prevent copies of the content from being widely distributed. Such distribution can cause economic harm to the content's copyright owner and others. Our protocol, SPIES, allows one party to sell a secret to second party and provides an economic incentive for two parties to limit sharing of a secret between themselves. We do not use watermarking or traditional DRM mechanisms. We focus on content which is to be shared between two parties only, which is valuable, and which only needs to be protected for a limited amount of time. Examples include passwords to a subscription service, pre-release of media for review, or content shared but bound by a non disclosure agreement. With SPIES, any possesor of the content can receive a portion of the funds placed in escrow by the two legitimate possesors. We analyze this system and show that the best strategy of the content provider and content consumer to maximize their utility is to use SPIES and not share the content further. We deal successfully with a "dummy registration" attack in which multiple false identities are used in an attempt to get a higher payment. We also discuss how to determine the correct escrow amount.