STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Digital signets: self-enforcing protection of digital information (preliminary version)
STOC '96 Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Privacy-preserving data mining
SIGMOD '00 Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
Watermarking relational data: framework, algorithms and analysis
The VLDB Journal — The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
Analysis of an incentives-based secrets protection system
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Data Collection with Self-Enforcing Privacy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Efficient Multi-authorizer Accredited Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Efficient and Anonymous Online Data Collection
DASFAA '09 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Database Systems for Advanced Applications
Collusion-resistant anonymous data collection method
Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Accountability as a Way Forward for Privacy Protection in the Cloud
CloudCom '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cloud Computing
Opportunistic sensing: security challenges for the new paradigm
COMSNETS'09 Proceedings of the First international conference on COMmunication Systems And NETworks
Accredited symmetrically private information retrieval
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
Private location centric profiles for GeoSocial networks
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Advances in Geographic Information Systems
Toward preserving privacy and functionality in geosocial networks
Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile computing & networking
How to keep a secret: leakage deterring public-key cryptosystems
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Consider a pollster who wishes to collect private, sensitive data from a number of distrustful individuals. How might the pollster convince the respondents that it is trustworthy? Alternately, what mechanism could the respondents insist upon to ensure that mismanagement of their data is detectable and publicly demonstrable?We detail this problem, and provide simple data submission protocols with the properties that a) leakage of private data by the pollster results in evidence of the transgression and b) the evidence cannot be fabricated without breaking cryptographic assumptions. With such guarantees, a responsible pollster could post a "privacy-bond", forfeited to anyone who can provide evidence of leakage. The respondents are assured that appropriate penalties are applied to a leaky pollster, while the protection from spurious indictment ensures that any honest pollster has no disincentive to participate in such a scheme.