Tracing traitors

  • Authors:
  • B. Chor;A. Fiat;M. Naor;B. Pinkas

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Comput. Sci., Technion-Israel Inst. of Technol., Haifa;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We give cryptographic schemes that help trace the source of leaks when sensitive or proprietary data is made available to a large set of parties. A very relevant application is in the context of pay television, where only paying customers should be able to view certain programs. In this application, the programs are normally encrypted, and then the sensitive data is the decryption keys that are given to paying customers. If a pirate decoder is found, it is desirable to reveal the source of its decryption keys. We describe fully resilient schemes which can be used against any decoder which decrypts with nonnegligible probability. Since there is typically little demand for decoders which decrypt only a small fraction of the transmissions (even if it is nonnegligible), we further introduce threshold tracing schemes which can only be used against decoders which succeed in decryption with probability greater than some threshold. Threshold schemes are considerably more efficient than fully resilient schemes