Practical forensic analysis in advanced access content system

  • Authors:
  • Hongxia Jin;Jeffery Lotspiech

  • Affiliations:
  • IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, CA;IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, CA

  • Venue:
  • ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In this paper we focus on the use of a traitor tracing scheme for distribution models that are one-to-many. It can be a networked broadcast system; It can be based on prerecorded or recordable physical media. In this type of system, it is infeasible to mark each copy differently for each receipt. Instead, the system broadcasts limited variations at certain points, and a recipient device has the cryptographic keys that allow it to decrypt only one of the variations at each point. Over time, when unauthorized copies of the protected content are observed, a traitor tracing scheme allows the detection of the devices that have participated in the construction of the pirated copies. The authors have been involved in what we believe is the first large-scale deployment of the tracing traitors approach in a content protection standard for the new generation of high-definition DVD optical discs. Along the way, we have had to solve both practical and theoretical problems that had not been apparent in the literature to date. In this paper we will mainly present this state of practice of the traitor tracing technology and show some of our experience in bringing this important technology to practice.