Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Efficient, DoS-resistant, secure key exchange for internet protocols
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The "Ticket" Concept for Copy Control Based on Embedded Signalling
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
A Secure, Robust Watermark for Multimedia
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of an incentives-based secrets protection system
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
DigiBox: a self-protecting container for information commerce
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
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Once electronic content-such as a password to access a website's resources-has been released, it is very difficult to prevent it from being shared. This disclosure often represents economic harm to the content's owner and others. Most attempts to prevent unauthorized sharing of digital content have been based on technology or legal punishments, but these approaches are not always applicable (as with passwords) or fast enough to prevent harm (as with the use of legal punishments). We propose the use of economic incentives to both limit and detect unauthorized sharing. This approach has the advantage of not requiring watermarking, encryption, or other traditional digital rights management techniques. Our protocol, called SPIES, is applicable to content that is shared to a limited extent and that meets several economic conditions. These conditions apply for many forms of content that are currently protected using technological sharing-prevention techniques. Such applications include passwords, trade secrets, pre-release content, and many others. We formalize this protocol using game theoretic analysis, and we show how to set the specific parameters under which SPIES can be useful.