Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Safety-Oriented Platform for Web Applications
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Protecting browser state from web privacy attacks
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web
Finding security vulnerabilities in java applications with static analysis
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Taint-enhanced policy enforcement: a practical approach to defeat a wide range of attacks
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
SessionSafe: implementing XSS immune session handling
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
SSLock: sustaining the trust on entities brought by SSL
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Residue objects: a challenge to web browser security
Proceedings of the 5th European conference on Computer systems
An architecture for enforcing end-to-end access control over web applications
Proceedings of the 15th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Convergence of desktop and web applications on a multi-service OS
HotSec'09 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Cross-origin javascript capability leaks: detection, exploitation, and defense
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
The multi-principal OS construction of the gazelle web browser
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
xJS: practical XSS prevention for web application development
WebApps'10 Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX conference on Web application development
Trust and protection in the Illinois browser operating system
OSDI'10 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
Securing script-based extensibility in web browsers
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Designing and Implementing the OP and OP2 Web Browsers
ACM Transactions on the Web (TWEB)
Mitigating cross-site form history spamming attacks with domain-based ranking
DIMVA'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment
Permission re-delegation: attacks and defenses
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Atlantis: robust, extensible execution environments for web applications
SOSP '11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles
SCRIPTGARD: automatic context-sensitive sanitization for large-scale legacy web applications
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Ribbons: a partially shared memory programming model
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM international conference on Object oriented programming systems languages and applications
The web interface should be radically refactored
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
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Browsers' isolation mechanisms are critical to users' safety and privacy on the web. Achieving proper isolations, however, is very difficult. Historical data show that even for seemingly simple isolation policies, the current browser implementations are surprisingly error-prone. Isolation bugs have been exploited on most major browser products. This paper presents a focused study of browser isolation bugs and attacks. We found that because of the intrinsic complexity of browser components, it is impractical to exhaustively examine the browser implementation to eliminate these bugs. In this paper, we propose the script accenting mechanism as a light-weight transparent defense to enhance the current domain isolation mechanism. The basic idea is to introduce domain-specific "accents" to scripts and HTML object names so that two frames cannot communicate/interfere if they have different accents. The mechanism has been prototyped on Internet Explorer. Our evaluations showed that all known attacks were defeated, and the proposed mechanism is fully transparent to existing web applications. The measurement about end-to-end browsing time did not show any noticeable slowdown. We also argue that accenting could be a primitive that is general enough for implementing other domain-isolation policies.