The multi-principal OS construction of the gazelle web browser

  • Authors:
  • Helen J. Wang;Chris Grier;Alexander Moshchuk;Samuel T. King;Piali Choudhury;Herman Venter

  • Affiliations:
  • Microsoft Research;University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;University of Washington;University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;Microsoft Research;Microsoft Research

  • Venue:
  • SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Original web browsers were applications designed to view static web content. As web sites evolved into dynamic web applications that compose content from multiple web sites, browsers have become multiprincipal operating environments with resources shared among mutually distrusting web site principals. Nevertheless, no existing browsers, including new architectures like IE 8, Google Chrome, and OP, have a multi-principal operating system construction that gives a browser-based OS the exclusive control to manage the protection of all system resources among web site principals. In this paper, we introduce Gazelle, a secure web browser constructed as a multi-principal OS. Gazelle's browser kernel is an operating system that exclusively manages resource protection and sharing across web site principals. This construction exposes intricate design issues that no previous work has identified, such as crossprotection-domain display and events protection. We elaborate on these issues and provide comprehensive solutions. Our prototype implementation and evaluation experience indicates that it is realistic to turn an existing browser into a multi-principal OS that yields significantly stronger security and robustness with acceptable performance.