Snort 2.0 Intrusion Detection
Reversing: The Hacker's Guide to Reverse Engineering
Reversing: The Hacker's Guide to Reverse Engineering
Scalability, fidelity, and containment in the potemkin virtual honeyfarm
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
StarBED and SpringOS: large-scale general purpose network testbed and supporting software
valuetools '06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Performance evaluation methodolgies and tools
Virtual Machines: Versatile Platforms for Systems and Processes (The Morgan Kaufmann Series in Computer Architecture and Design)
Malware: Fighting Malicious Code
Malware: Fighting Malicious Code
Virtualization with Xen(tm): Including XenEnterprise, XenServer, and XenExpress: Including XenEnterprise, XenServer, and XenExpress
The nepenthes platform: an efficient approach to collect malware
RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Spamulator: the Internet on a laptop
Proceedings of the 13th annual conference on Innovation and technology in computer science education
PhishCage: reproduction of fraudulent websites in the emulated internet
Proceedings of the 6th International ICST Conference on Simulation Tools and Techniques
COSMO - emulation of internet traffic: poster abstract
Proceedings of the 6th International ICST Conference on Simulation Tools and Techniques
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Recent viruses, worms, and bots, called malwares, often have anti-analysis functions such as mechanisms that confirm connectivity to certain Internet hosts and detect virtualized environments. We discuss how malwares can be kept alive in an analyzing environment by disabling their anti-analyzing mechanisms. To avoid any impacts to/from the Internet, we conclude that analyzing environments should be disconnected from the Internet but must be able to make malwares believe that they are connected to the real Internet. We also conclude that, for executing environments to analyze anti-virtualization malwares, they should not be virtualized but must be as easily re-constructable as a virtualized environment. To reconcile these cross-purposes, we designed an isolated sandbox that consists of a mimetic Internet and renewable actual nodes. We implemented a prototype system and conducted an experiment to test the efficiency of our sandbox.