Unawareness and strategic announcements in games with uncertainty

Authors:
Erkut Y. Ozbay
Affiliations:
New York University, New York, NY
Venue:
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Year:
2007

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Abstract

I study games with uncertainty where players have different awareness regarding a chance player's moves (contingencies). An announcer, who is fully aware of the contingencies, can announce some of them to an unaware decision maker (DM) before the DM takes an action. I introduce an equilibrium concept and a refinement to study the way the DM generates her belief on her extended awareness.