Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
A game-theoretic account of implicature
TARK '92 Proceedings of the fourth conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Relevance of communicative acts
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Unawareness and strategic announcements in games with uncertainty
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
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We model unawareness of possibilities in decision making and pragmatic reasoning. A background model is filtered through a state of limited awareness to provide the epistemic state of an agent who is not attending to all possibilities. We extend the standard notion of awareness with assumptions (implicit beliefs about propositions the agent is unaware of) and define a dynamic update for 'becoming aware.' We give a propositional model and a decision-theoretic model, and show how pragmatic relevance reasoning can be described in the latter. An utterance can be relevant even if semantically uninformative, if it brings relevant alternatives to awareness. This gives an explanation for the use of possibility modals and questions as hedged suggestions, bringing possibilities to awareness but only implicating their degree of desirability or probability.