ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Reasoning about knowledge
An authentication logic supporting synchronization, revocation, and recency
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
PROCOMET '98 Proceedings of the IFIP TC2/WG2.2,2.3 International Conference on Programming Concepts and Methods
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Computational and Information-Theoretic Soundness and Completeness of Formal Encryption
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Journal of Cryptology
Verifying epistemic protocols under common knowledge
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Automatic verification of epistemic specifications under convergent equational theories
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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We propose a principled approach to model secrecy in multiagent systems, by defining a set of possible observations and providing agents with algorithms used to distinguish the possible states of the system. Our approach fits naturally within a knowledge-based account of secrecy. By adjusting both the kind of observations and the capabilities of the agents, we can capture in a natural way different forms of secrecy in the presence of perfect cryptography. In particular, we show how to model extraction secrecy. Our formalization suggests a unified definition of secrecy for cryptographic protocols and for systems that seek to prevent inadmissible flows of information.