Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP

  • Authors:
  • Steve Schneider

  • Affiliations:
  • Univ. of London, Egham, UK

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
  • Year:
  • 1998

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Abstract

This paper presents a general approach for analysis and verification of authentication properties using the theory of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). The paper aims to develop a specific theory appropriate to the analysis of authentication protocols, built on top of the general CSP semantic framework. This approach aims to combine the ability to express such protocols in a natural and precise way with the ability to reason formally about the properties they exhibit. The theory is illustrated by an examination of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol. The protocol is first examined with respect to a single run and then more generally with respect to multiple concurrent runs.