Verifying security protocols: an application of CSP

Authors:
Steve Schneider;Rob Delicata
Affiliations:
Department of Computing, University of Surrey;Department of Computing, University of Surrey
Venue:
CSP'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Communicating Sequential Processes: the First 25 Years
Year:
2004

Citing 34
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Abstract

The field of protocol analysis is one area in which CSP has proven particularly successful, and several techniques have been proposed that use CSP to reason about security properties such as confidentiality and authentication. In this paper we describe one such approach, based on theorem-proving, that uses the idea of a rank function to establish the correctness of protocols. This description is motivated by the consideration of a simple, but flawed, authentication protocol. We show how a rank function analysis can be used to locate this flaw and prove that a modified version of the protocol is correct.