On the symbolic reduction of processes with cryptographic functions
Theoretical Computer Science
Proof Theory, Transformations, and Logic Programming for Debugging Security Protocols
LOPSTR '01 Selected papers from the 11th International Workshop on Logic Based Program Synthesis and Transformation
Automated Unbounded Verification of Security Protocols
CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Automatic testing equivalence verification of spi calculus specifications
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
An approach to the formal verification of the three-principal cryptographic protocols
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Security properties: two agents are sufficient
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on 12th European symposium on programming (ESOP 2003)
Decidability of context-explicit security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR
Theoretical Computer Science
Deciding knowledge properties of security protocols
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
On the impossibility of building secure cliques-type authenticated group key agreement protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW17
Understanding the intruder through attacks on cryptographic protocols
Proceedings of the 44th annual Southeast regional conference
Improving the security of industrial networks by means of formal verification
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A (restricted) quantifier elimination for security protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Trust-Rated Authentication for Domain-Structured Distributed Systems
EuroPKI '08 Proceedings of the 5th European PKI workshop on Public Key Infrastructure: Theory and Practice
Challenges in the Automated Verification of Security Protocols
IJCAR '08 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Automated Reasoning
From One Session to Many: Dynamic Tags for Security Protocols
LPAR '08 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
Rewriting Techniques in the Constraint Solver
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Dynamic Observers for the Synthesis of Opaque Systems
ATVA '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
Automatic Testing of Access Control for Security Properties
TESTCOM '09/FATES '09 Proceedings of the 21st IFIP WG 6.1 International Conference on Testing of Software and Communication Systems and 9th International FATES Workshop
Associative-commutative deducibility constraints
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Security properties: two agents are sufficient
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Bounding messages for free in security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
3-party approach for fast handover in EAP-based wireless networks
OTM'07 Proceedings of the 2007 OTM confederated international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems: CoopIS, DOA, ODBASE, GADA, and IS - Volume Part II
Multi-Attacker Protocol Validation
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Synthesis of opaque systems with static and dynamic masks
Formal Methods in System Design
Verifying security protocols: an application of CSP
CSP'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Communicating Sequential Processes: the First 25 Years
Soundness of removing cancellation identities in protocol analysis under Exclusive-OR
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
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Model checking approaches to the analysis of security protocolshave proved remarkably successful. The basic approach is to producea model of a small system running the protocol, together with amodel of the most general intruder who can interact with theprotocol, and then to use a state exploration tool to search forattacks. This has led to a number of new attacks upon protocolsbeing discovered.However, if no attack is found, this only tells us that there isno attack upon the small system we modelled; there may bean attack upon some larger system. This is the question we considerin this paper: we prove that under certain conditions onthe protocol and the environment in which it operates, if there isno attack upon a particular small system (with one honest agent foreach role of the protocol) leading to a breach of secrecy, thenthere is no attack on any larger system leading to a breach ofsecrecy.