An approach to the formal verification of the three-principal cryptographic protocols

Authors:
Yuqing Zhang;Xiuying Liu
Affiliations:
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, GSCAS, Beijing, P.R. China;National Computer Network Intrusion Protection Center, GSCAS, Beijing P.R. China
Venue:
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Year:
2004

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Abstract

Based on the model checking theory, we derive the Running-Mode Analysis of three-principal cryptographic protocols from the Running-Mode Analysis of two-principal cryptographic protocols. To test this method, we analyze the Davis Swick protocol and successfully prove the security this protocol. Therefore, we can draw a conclusion that Running-Mode Analysis of three-principal cryptographic protocol is available.