Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automatic verification of security in payment protocols for electronic commerce
Enterprise information systems IV
An approach to the formal verification of the three-principal cryptographic protocols
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
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A common framework, which can be used to analyze the two-party security protocols, is proposed in this paper. With the common framework, a common program is developed in order that any two-party security protocol can be automatically analyzed through SMV with slight modification of the common program. Finally, we illustrate the feasibility and efficiency of the common program analysis with the SSL 3.0 protocol as a case study.