Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Keynote Address: The Changing Environment
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
TCS '00 Proceedings of the International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science, Exploring New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
Game Analysis of Abuse-free Contract Signing
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automatic verification of cryptographic protocols: a logic programming approach
Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Principles and practice of declaritive programming
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Formal Correctness of Security Protocols (Information Security and Cryptography)
Formal Correctness of Security Protocols (Information Security and Cryptography)
LTL Model Checking for Security Protocols
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
A formal model of rational exchange and its application to the analysis of Syverson's protocol
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
SAT-based model-checking for security protocols analysis
International Journal of Information Security
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Validating Security Protocols under the General Attacker
Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis
Metareasoning about Security Protocols using Distributed Temporal Logic
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Compiling and verifying security protocols
LPAR'00 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Logic for programming and automated reasoning
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Kerberos: an authentication service for computer networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
Verifying multicast-based security protocols using the inductive method
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
An updated threat model for security ceremonies
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Security protocols have been analysed focusing on a variety of properties to withstand the Dolev-Yao attacker. The Multi-Attacker treat model allows each protocol participant to behave maliciously intercepting and forging messages. Each principal may then behave as a Dolev-Yao attacker while neither colluding nor sharing knowledge with anyone else. This feature rules out the applicability of existing equivalence results in the Dolev-Yao model. The analysis of security protocols under the Multi-Attacker threat model brings forward yet more insights, such as retaliation attacks and anticipation attacks, which formalise currently realistic scenarios of principals competing each other for personal profit. They are variously demonstrated on a classical protocol, Needham-Schroeder's, and on a modern deployed protocol, Google's SAML-based single sign-on protocol. The general threat model for security protocols based on set-rewriting that was adopted in AVISPA (Armando et al. 2005) is extended to formalise the Multi-Attacker. The state-of-the-art model checker SATMC (Armando and Compagna, Int J Inf Secur 6(1):3---32, 2007) is then used to automatically validate the protocols under the new threats, so that retaliation and anticipation attacks can automatically be found. The tool support scales up to the Multi-Attacker threat model at a reasonable price both in terms of human interaction effort and of computational time.