Fairness in electronic commerce
Fairness in electronic commerce
The quest for security in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiHoc '01 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Inductive methods and contract-signing protocols
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Security: for ubiquitous computing
Security: for ubiquitous computing
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Distributed Algorithms
Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions
IEEE Internet Computing
Controlled Gradual Disclosure Schemes for Random Bits and Their Applications
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Rational Exchange - A Formal Model Based on Game Theory
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
Self-Organized Public-Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Mobility helps security in ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Weakly Secret Bit Commitment: Applications to Lotteries and Fair Exchange
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Formal Analysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Approaching a Formal Definition of Fairness in Electronic Commerce
SRDS '99 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
Providing Robust and Ubiquitous Security Support for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols
Report on a working session on security in wireless ad hoc networks
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Ripping coins for a fair exchange
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Toward self-organized mobile ad hoc networks: the terminodes project
IEEE Communications Magazine
Key agreement in ad hoc networks
Computer Communications
Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Integrated cellular and ad hoc relaying systems: iCAR
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Fair Exchange Is Incomparable to Consensus
Proceedings of the 5th international colloquium on Theoretical Aspects of Computing
Risk balance in exchange protocols
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Multi-Attacker Protocol Validation
Journal of Automated Reasoning
An extended model of rational exchange based on dynamic games of imperfect information
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Risk balance in optimistic non-repudiation protocols
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
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We propose a formal model of rational exchange and exchange protocols in general, which is based on game theory. In this model, an exchange protocol is represented as a set of strategies in a game that is played by the protocol parties and the network that they use to communicate with each other. Within this model, we give a formal definition for rational exchange and various other properties of exchange protocols, including fairness. In particular, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium in the protocol game. We also study the relationship between rational and fair exchange, and prove that fairness implies rationality, but not vice versa. Finally, we illustrate the usage of our formal model for the analysis of existing rational exchange protocols by analyzing a protocol proposed by Syverson. We show that the protocol is rational only under the assumption that the network is reliable.