Inductive methods and contract-signing protocols

Authors:
R. Chadha;M. Kanovich;A. Scedrov
Affiliations:
University of Pennsylvania;University of Pennsylvania;University of Pennsylvania
Venue:
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Year:
2001

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Abstract

Garay, Jakobsson and MacKenzie introduced the notion of abuse-free distributed contract-signing: at any stage of the protocol, no participant Ahas the ability to prove to an outside party, that A has the power to choose between completing the contract and aborting it. We study a version of this property, which is naturally formulated in terms of game strategies, and which we formally state and prove for a two-party, optimistic contract-signing protocol. We extend to this setting the formal inductive proof methods previously used in the formal analysis of simpler, trace-based properties of authentication protocols.