Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Inductive methods and contract-signing protocols
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
On the symbolic reduction of processes with cryptographic functions
Theoretical Computer Science
An Improved Constraint-Based System for the Verification of Security Protocols
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR
LICS '03 Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Game Analysis of Abuse-free Contract Signing
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Tool for Lazy Verification of Security Protocols
Proceedings of the 16th IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Formal Analysis of Multi-Party Contract Signing
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Constraint solving for contract-signing protocols
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Analysis of probabilistic contract signing
Journal of Computer Security
Deciding properties of contract-signing protocols
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis: emerging issues and trends
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
Research on the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols has so far concentrated on reachability properties, such as secrecy and authentication. In this article, we prove that certain game-theoretic security properties, including balance for contract-signing protocols, can be decided in a Dolev-Yao style model with a bounded number of sessions. The decision algorithm that we develop is based on standard constraint-solving procedures, which, in the past, have successfully been employed in tools for reachability properties. Our result thus paves the way for extending these tools to deal with game-theoretic security properties.