An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR

  • Authors:
  • Yannick Chevalier;Ralf Küsters;Michaël Rusinowitch;Mathieu Turuani

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • LICS '03 Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographicprotocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yaointruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended withso-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certainconditions. As an instance of this general framework,we obtain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruderthat can exploit the properties of the XOR operator. Thisoperator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols butcannot be handled in most protocol models. An immediateconsequence of our proof is that checking whether amessage can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is inP. We also apply our framework to an intruder that exploitsproperties of certain encryption modes such as cipher blockchaining (CBC).