Normal proofs in intruder theories

Authors:
Vincent Bernat;Hubert Comon-Lundh
Affiliations:
LSV, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Cachan cedex, France;LSV, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Cachan cedex, France
Venue:
ASIAN'06 Proceedings of the 11th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: secure software and related issues
Year:
2006

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Abstract

Given an arbitrary intruder deduction capability, modeled as an inference system S and a protocol, we show how to compute an inference system s such that the security problem for an unbounded number of sessions is equivalent to the deducibility of some message in S. Then, assuming that S has some subformula property, we lift such a property to S, thanks to a proof normalisation theorem. In general, for an unbounded number of sessions, this provides with a complete deduction strategy. In case of a bounded number of sessions, our theorem implies that the security problem is co-NP-complete. As an instance of our result we get a decision algorithm for the theory of blind-signatures, which, to our knowledge, was not known before.