Complexity results for security protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and commuting public key encryption

  • Authors:
  • Yannick Chevalier;Ralf Küsters;Michaël Rusinowitch;Mathieu Turuani

  • Affiliations:
  • IRIT-Université Paul Sabatier, Toulouse Cedex, France;Universität Trier, Trier, Germany;LORIA-INRIA-Université Henri Poincaré, Villers les Nancy Cedex, France;LORIA-INRIA-Université Henri Poincaré, Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy Cedex, France

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We show that the insecurity problem for protocols with modular exponentiation and arbitrary products allowed in exponents is NP-complete. This result is based on a protocol and intruder model which is powerful enough to uncover known attacks on the Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH.2) protocol suite. To prove our results, we develop a general framework in which the Dolev-Yao intruder is extended by generic intruder rules. This framework is also applied to obtain complexity results for protocols with commuting public key encryption.