Generic Insecurity of Cliques-Type Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols

  • Authors:
  • Olivier Pereira;Jean-Jacques Quisquater

  • Affiliations:
  • UCL Crypto Group, Belgium;UCL Crypto Group, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group keyagreement protocols showed to be flawed at CSFW 2001.Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variantsof them) have been rediscovered in several different frameworks,no fixed version of these protocols has been proposeduntil now.In this paper, we describe a proof that it is in fact impossibleto design a scalable authenticated group key agreementprotocol based on the same building blocks as the A-GDHones. We proceed by providing a systematic way toderive an attack against any A-GDH-type protocol with atleast four participants (and exhibit protocols with two andthree participants which we cannot break). As far as weknow, this is the first generic insecurity result reported inthe literature concerning authentication protocols.