Multichannel Security Protocols
IEEE Pervasive Computing
A Clustering-based Group Key Agreement Protocol for Ad-Hoc Networks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
Verifying Multi-party Authentication Using Rank Functions and PVS
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Verification of security protocols with lists: from length one to unbounded length
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Verification of security protocols with lists: From length one to unbounded length
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group keyagreement protocols showed to be flawed at CSFW 2001.Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variantsof them) have been rediscovered in several different frameworks,no fixed version of these protocols has been proposeduntil now.In this paper, we describe a proof that it is in fact impossibleto design a scalable authenticated group key agreementprotocol based on the same building blocks as the A-GDHones. We proceed by providing a systematic way toderive an attack against any A-GDH-type protocol with atleast four participants (and exhibit protocols with two andthree participants which we cannot break). As far as weknow, this is the first generic insecurity result reported inthe literature concerning authentication protocols.