Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CLIQUES: A New Approach to Group Key Agreement
ICDCS '98 Proceedings of the The 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Some attacks upon authenticated group key agreement protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Generic Insecurity of Cliques-Type Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
Selecting theories and recursive protocols
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Attacking Group Protocols by Refuting Incorrect Inductive Conjectures
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers
IJCAR '08 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Automated Reasoning
Using ProVerif to Analyze Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Decidable Analysis for a Class of Cryptographic Group Protocols with Unbounded Lists
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
On the automatic analysis of recursive security protocols with XOR
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Key agreement in ad hoc networks
Computer Communications
Verifying multicast-based security protocols using the inductive method
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Automatic verification of protocols with lists of unbounded length
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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We present a novel, simple technique for proving secrecy properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for an unbounded number of sessions. More specifically, our technique relies on the Horn clause approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif: we show that if a protocol is proven secure by our technique with lists of length one, then it is secure for lists of unbounded length. Interestingly, this theorem relies on approximations made by our verification technique: in general, secrecy for lists of length one does not imply secrecy for lists of unbounded length. Our result can be used in particular to prove secrecy properties for group protocols with an unbounded number of participants and for some XML protocols (web services) with ProVerif.