Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers
IJCAR '08 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Automated Reasoning
Some encounters on the productive use of a failed proof attempt or a counterexample
MICAI'10 Proceedings of the 9th Mexican international conference on Advances in artificial intelligence: Part I
Verification of security protocols with lists: from length one to unbounded length
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Revoke and let live: a secure key revocation api for cryptographic devices
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
European collaboration on automated reasoning
AI Communications - ECAI 2012 Turing and Anniversary Track
Verification of security protocols with lists: From length one to unbounded length
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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Automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often fail to deal adequately with group protocols. The reason is that the abstractions made to improve performance on fixed two- or three-party protocols either preclude the modeling of group protocols altogether or permit modeling only in a fixed scenario, which can prevent attacks from being discovered. This paper describes Coral, a tool for finding counterexamples to incorrect inductive conjectures, which we have used to model protocols for both group key agreement and group key management, without any restrictions on the scenario. We show how we used Coral to discover six previously unknown attacks on three group protocols.